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Abstract. We present cross-national analyses – both cross-sectional and longitudinal – esti-
mating the vote shares for approximately 80 parties across Western Europe from 1984 to
1998. The results indicate that parties’ vote shares increase with their proximity to the centre
of the voter distribution, although the effects are relatively small. These findings corrobo-
rate the theoretical results reported by Lin et al. in their article ‘Equilibrium in Multican-
didate Probabilistic Spatial Voting’ (Public Choice, Vol. 98, pp. 59–82), and provide support
for conclusions reported by other authors who rely on simulations of individual-level data
from national election surveys.
Introduction
Can parties in Western Europe gain votes by converging towards the mean
(or median) voter’s position? Traditional spatial theory clearly predicts that,
ceterus paribus, parties contesting two-party elections gain votes by converg-
ing towards the centre (Downs 1957). However, prior studies of models of
multiparty elections report conflicting conclusions. Theoretical models that
assume deterministic policy voting suggest that noncentrist positioning may
be optimal1 (Cox 1990; see also Adams 2001), while models with probabilistic
voting suggest that parties increase their expected votes by shifting in the
direction of the mean voter position (Lin et al. 1999; De Palma et al. 1990).
However, recent work by Norman Schofield (2004; see also Schofield & Sened
forthcoming) and by Adams and Merrill (1999, 2000; see also Adams 2001;
Merrill & Adams 2002) has challenged this conclusion, suggesting that when
measured nonpolicy-related voting influences are introduced into the proba-
bilistic voting model, then parties may enhance their vote by shifting away
from the centre of the voter distribution.2
In addition, simulations based on individual-level survey data from real-
world elections also reach conflicting conclusions, with some studies finding
that centrist positioning would increase support for parties contesting multi-
party elections (Alvarez et al. 2000a, 2000b; Schofield et al. 1998a, 1998b),
while other simulation studies conclude that parties may maximize votes by
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presenting distinctly noncentrist positions (Adams & Merrill 1999, 2000).
These differing conclusions based on election survey data arise in part from
differences in the historical elections under review, but also from the analysts’
differing assumptions about voters’ decision rules and the number of parties
contesting the election (see Schofield 2001; Adams & Merrill 2000). However,
note that none of the studies cited above analyze the linkages between parties’
vote shares in real-world elections and their proximity to the centre of the
policy space in these elections.
The goal of this article is to conduct such an analysis. Specifically, we
conduct a macro-level analysis of party positioning and election outcomes
across Western Europe from 1984 to 1998, in which the dependent variables
are the parties’ vote shares in real-world elections, and the crucial indepen-
dent variables are the policy distances between the parties and the mean voter
positions in the countries included in our study. For this purpose, we employ
the Eurobarometer surveys from the relevant election years, which allow us
to construct measures of the mean citizen policy preference in each country,
as well as measures of the policy distances between the parties’ positions (as
perceived by the citizens) and the mean citizen preference.3 This macro-level
approach has been used extensively in empirical studies of the electoral effects
of candidates’/parties’ positioning in American elections (see Burden 2001;
Erikson & Wright 1993, 1997; Erikson et al. 2002; Ansolabehere et al. 2001;
Canes-Wrone et al. 2002), as well as in studies on the electoral effects of eco-
nomic conditions both inside and outside the United States (see Lewis-Beck
1988; Paldam 1991; Powell & Whitten 1993; Powell 2000). However, to our
knowledge this approach has not previously been used to estimate the elec-
toral effects of party positioning outside the United States.4
Our findings support the conclusions developed in many of the existing
studies of multiparty competition: proximity to the mean voter position matters.
More specifically, we conclude that parties receive a statistically significant
electoral benefit from locating near the mean voter position. This benefit,
however, is relatively modest in size, so that parties that advocate noncentrist
positions may nonetheless be electorally competitive. This conclusion corrob-
orates the findings suggested by Schofield’s (2004; see also Schofield et al.
1998a, 1998b) simulation studies, as well as the conclusions reported by
Alvarez and his co-authors (Alvarez et al. 2000a, 2000b). Given that our con-
clusions are derived from a methodology that is completely different from the
Alvarez-Schofield approach, these results, in toto, give us increased confidence
that our estimates of the electoral effects of party positioning are accurate.
This is an important finding because, as we will discuss later, these earlier
studies employ a simulation approach that relies on several strong assump-
tions not necessarily satisfied in practice.
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Our results are important for several reasons. First, paramount to the
spatial modeling enterprise is the notion that parties’ issue positions matter
for elections. If the empirical evidence shows that party and voter positioning
is unrelated to electoral outcomes, then this may call into question a central
assumption that underlies spatial modeling. Second, our results have impor-
tant implications for political representation. The ideological ‘congruence
between citizens and policy makers’ is one of the central features of democ-
racy (Huber & Powell 1994). Democratic theory informs us that elections are
supposed to reveal the will of the people. The title of G. Bingham Powell’s
seminal work Elections as Instruments of Democracy (2000) aptly summarizes
this concept of representation. Methodologically speaking, a cross-national
‘snapshot’ comparing party proximities and vote shares provides an important
measure of the extent to which elections fulfill the function that Powell
ascribes to them.5 Related to this idea, there is also a perceptible empirical
relationship between government policy outputs and those of the median
party in governing coalitions (Budge & McDonald n.d.). In addition, this
article speaks to issues of dynamic representation (Stimson et al. 1995) in 
that we evaluate the electoral impacts of shifts in public opinion over time in
order to determine whether parties benefit at the ballot box when public pref-
erences shift in their direction between elections. Finally, there are implica-
tions for party strategies (Budge 1994) and their ideological positioning in
elections.
In the next section, we briefly survey the existing approaches used to study
the electoral effects of party positioning in multiparty elections. The section
after that highlights some of the limitations of these studies, and proposes 
an alternative approach relying on the national level of observation. We 
then refine hypotheses regarding proximity and employ the cross-national
approach before discussing our conclusions.
Existing theory and empirical approaches
Several empirical studies exist that explore multiparty systems and party
behaviour using the spatial modeling framework. In a series of important
papers, Schofield and his co-authors examine party competition within several
democracies: Britain, France, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Schofield 1997, 2004; Schofield et al.
1998a, 1998b; Schofield & Sened forthcoming). In addition,Adams and Merrill 
(1999, 2000; see also Adams et al., forthcoming) analyze party competition in
Norway, France and Britain. Dow (2001) explores elections in Canada, France,
the Netherlands and Israel, while Alvarez and Nagler (1995, 1998; see also
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Alvarez et al. 2000a, 2000b) analyze elections in Canada, Britain and the
Netherlands.
All of these analyses use national survey data. More specifically, they rely
on three important measurements to complete their analyses: the individual
self-placements of the survey respondents along one or more policy scales; the
respondents’ placements of the parties along these same policy scales; and the
respondents’ reported vote decisions.6 Starting with these three measurements
– and, in some cases, including additional variables such as sociodemographic
characteristics, evaluations of the party leaders’ personal qualities, party iden-
tification and retrospective evaluations of the economy – the authors cited
above estimate the parameters of individual-level voting models, which are
functions of the policy distances between the respondents’ preferred positions
and the positions of the competing parties. Using the parameter estimates
from these individual-level models, the authors aggregate the individual
responses in order to estimate the parties’ expected vote shares in the his-
torical elections under review. The major payoff of these analyses is that the
analysts can estimate the expected changes in vote shares if parties shifted
their policy positions. They can then use these estimates to compute both the
parties’ vote-maximizing positions, and the magnitude of the vote losses that
parties can expect to suffer as they diverge from these policy optima.
For the most part, the authors cited above find that, ceterus paribus, parties
can expect to gain votes by presenting centrist policies relative to the mean
voter position (but see Adams & Merrill 1999, 2000; Schofield 2004; Schofield
& Sened forthcoming). Interestingly however, these authors conclude that
parties do not actually take their vote-maximizing positions. Schofield et al.
(1998a, 1998b) argue that parties take positions that put them in a good ‘space’
for post-election coalition formation, while Dow maintains that non-centrist
parties cannot feasibly shift to the moderate positions that would maximize
their support because the votes gained by taking more centrist positions are
offset by the credibility and reliability concerns created by the shifting policy
stances of the party.
While the studies cited above have been invaluable in advancing our
understanding of the electoral effects of party positioning, the simulation
approach that each set of authors employs features several strong assumptions.
First, they necessarily rely upon the coefficients estimated for individual-level
voting specifications so that their conclusions are only reliable to the extent
that these individual-level vote models are correctly specified. Unfortunately,
because behavioural researchers disagree sharply among themselves about the
proper specification for models of individual voting behaviour, it is difficult to
know what the proper voting specification is.7 Second, the authors’ simulation
approaches typically employ the assumption that parties can relocate without
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cost in the policy space, and furthermore, that parties’ policy shifts do not affect
voters’ criteria for evaluating the parties. Recent empirical work by Stokes
(1999) and by Alvarez and Nagler (2004) calls both of these assumptions into
question.8 Saving the methodological details for a later section, the pre-
sent study side-steps these problems by actually observing shifts in party 
proximity, and expanding the scope of study across 12 Western European
democracies.
Hypotheses, data and methods
Central hypotheses
We seek to test the following hypotheses on the relationship between party
positions, voter positions and election outcomes:
H1: Parties occupying positions close to the mean voter position receive
a higher proportion of the vote in national elections than do parties posi-
tioned farther away from the mean voter.
H2: Parties gain votes in national elections when the mean voter position
shifts in their direction between elections.
Introducing the data and developing key measurements
To test H1 and H2, it is necessary to develop measures of popular support (i.e.,
vote share) and proximity. The process of developing a measure for party
support is relatively straightforward. Using Mackie & Rose (1991, 1997), it is
possible to collect the absolute percentage of votes for each party in each elec-
tion.9 Still, one transformation is necessary, as we should expect successful
parties to receive fewer votes in systems where there are more competitive
parties. For example,the parties in our sample who receive a relatively large pro-
portion of popular support in Belgium – a system that features at least six com-
petitive parties – receive a lower absolute percentage of votes than the major
parties in Britain, which features just three competitive parties. Thus, a normal-
ized measure of vote-share is appropriate, which takes into account the number
of competitive parties in the given election. The measure we employ is:
(1)
where Vi equals the absolute share of the vote for party i, and Nj is the number
of parties in election j receiving over 5 per cent of the vote.10
Developing a measure of proximity is also straightforward. Eurobarome-
ter 31A (1989) asked approximately 1,000 respondents in each of 12 countries
Normalized Vote-share NV( ) = *V Ni j
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across (what was then known as) the European Community to place them-
selves, and each of their significant national parties, on a ‘left-right’ scale
ranging from 1 (extreme left) to 10 (extreme right).11 We use these placements
to compute the mean voter’s left-right position in each country, as well as the
parties’ (mean perceived) positions.12 As an example, Figure 1 presents the
voter distribution and the parties’ (mean perceived) left-right positions for
France.13
All of the measures presented in this article will derive from the difference
between the mean citizen preference and the mean party placement. We
measure the party’s proximity to the mean voter position by squaring the dif-
ference between party position and the mean citizen placement:14
(2)
where Ai is the position of the mean voter on a left-right continuum, and Xi
is the (mean perceived) position of party X.
In addition to the squared proximity measure, we employed a second and
slightly more complicated measure of proximity, which will help us evaluate
the first hypothesis. This alternative proximity measure divides the squared
proximity of a party by the average squared proximity of all the parties
Squared Proximity = -( )A Xi i
2
lawrence ezrow
© European Consortium for Political Research 2005
30 
20 
10 
Pe
r c
en
t
PC PS UDF 
Left/Right self-placements
RPR FN 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 7 
Figure 1. The ideological distribution of respondents and mean party placements in France.
Notes: This sample is from the Eurobarometer (31A) survey in 1989. The locations of the
parties are based on the respondents’ placements from the same survey.
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included in the analysis that are competing in the same election. The measure
accounts for differing average proximities across countries, and is referred to
as ‘relative squared proximity’. The variable is constructed as follows:
(3)
The construction of the relative squared proximity variable allows us to
control for cross-national differences in respondents’ interpretations of the
left-right scale and/or for differences in the dispersion of parties across dif-
ferent national settings.
The cross-sectional analysis (testing H1)
In Table 1, we estimate two specifications that relate the parties’ vote shares
to their proximities to the mean voter position: one using the squared prox-
imity variable and the other using the relative squared proximity variable. The
first specification is:
(4)
and the second specification is:
(5)
where e is a random disturbance term.
Reiterating some of the major points in the previous sections, our central
hypothesis is that the coefficient estimates relating to our measures of prox-
imity will be negative and statistically significant – that is, parties lose votes as
their policy distance to the mean voter position increases. The results reported
in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 support this hypothesis. For both measures of
proximity the coefficients are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01
level, which implies that ceteris paribus, the further away a party is from the
mean voter position in its national electorate, the fewer votes it receives.15
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 1 report results for an alternative set of analyses
in which our measure of the parties’ positions was based on experts’ place-
ments, as reported in a survey of country experts conducted by Huber and
Inglehart (1995). These analyses are important because, unlike the respon-
dents’ party placements, experts’ placements are unlikely to be contaminated
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Table 1. Coefficients for different measures of proximity when estimating Normalized Vote
shares across the European Community
Eurobarometer Expert placements
placements Huber-Inglehart
(1984–1994) (1988–1998)
Squared Relative squared Squared Relative squared
proximity proximity proximity proximity
Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 72.31 70.50 83.57 84.97
(4.95) (5.16) (5.62) (5.88)
Proximity -2.46 -10.11 -2.61 -5.93
(0.75) (3.90) (0.79) (1.79)
N 245 245 138 138
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.07
Notes: Each parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, employing a two-
tailed test. Estimated standard errors are in parentheses.
by assimilation and contrast effects, which have the potential to bias rank-and-
file survey respondents’ party placements.16 The results for the analyses based
on experts’ party placements display the same pattern as the analyses based
on the survey respondents’ party placements – namely, for both the squared
proximity measure and the relative squared proximity measure, the coeffi-
cients are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
Note that although the proximity coefficients are significant, they are still
quite small. Substantively, the coefficients for squared proximity represent
marginal expected losses for parties closer to the citizen mean, and rapidly
declining losses for those parties approaching the ideological extremes. For
instance, consider the parameter estimate in column 1, which is -2.46. This
implies that a party competing in a four-party system can expect to lose about
six-tenths of 1 per cent of the vote (0.6 per cent) as it shifts from the mean
voter’s position to a position one unit away from the mean voter position along
the 1 to 10 left-right scale. By contrast, if this party shifts from one unit away
from the mean voter to a position two units away, its expected vote loss
approaches 2.5 percentage points; a further shift to a position three units from
the mean is associated with an expected loss of about 5.5 percentage points,
relative to positioning at the mean voter position.17 Expected losses would be
greater in a system with fewer than four parties, and less in a system with more
than four parties.18 The proximity coefficients reported in columns 2 to 4
support similar substantive conclusions.
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The ‘proximity gain’ specification (testing H2)
Although the cross-sectional analyses reported in Table 1 suggest that parties’
vote shares increase modestly with proximity to the mean voter position, a
limitation of these tests is that we have not controlled for nonpolicy-related
sources of party strength such as the charisma of party leaders, parties’ 
campaign spending and economic conditions.19 To the extent that parties’ 
nonpolicy-related strength correlates with their policy positions, omission of
these variables may bias our estimates of the electoral effects of party ide-
ologies. Indeed, important work by Schofield (2004; see also Schofield & Sened
forthcoming) suggests that parties that enjoy nonpolicy-related advantages
have electoral incentives to present centrist positions, thereby providing the-
oretical support for such a correlation.
Here we address this problem by estimating the electoral effects of changes
in the parties’ proximities to the mean voter between elections.20 Using the
self-placement scores in the Eurobarometer, it is possible to determine the
magnitude and direction of the ideological shift of the mean citizen between
elections, and to use these shifts in the mean voter position to calculate
changes in each party’s (squared) proximity to the mean voter position.
Specifically, squared proximity gain is measured by subtracting the current
squared proximity from the squared proximity in the prior election. If a party
are moderate parties rewarded in multiparty systems?
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Table 2. Coefficients for the variables squared proximity gain [(Proxt-1)2 - (Proxt)2] and
lagged changes in normalized vote shares [NVt-1 - NVt-2] when estimating changes in nor-
malized vote shares [NVt - NVt-1] across the European Community 
Eurobarometer Expert placements
placements Huber-Inglehart
(1984–1994) (1988–1998)
Basic Advanced Basic Advanced
Coefficients (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -1.88* -2.52** -1.97 -2.38
(1.10) (1.13) (1.72) (1.76)
Squared 3.27*** 2.72*** 3.34** 3.16*
proximity gain (1.00) (1.02) (1.68) (1.70)
Lagged DNV -0.14** -0.09
(0.06) (0.09)
N 228 211 134 133
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02
Note: Estimated standard errors are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01, two-
tailed test.
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is closer to the citizen mean in the current election than in the prior one, the
measure will be positive. To the extent that we find that parties that experi-
ence proximity gains tend to increase their vote shares, we will have additional
evidence that proximity to the mean voter position enhances party support –
and, crucially, this test is not subject to the criticism that omitted nonpolicy-
related sources of party strength bias the results. The reason is that, even if
parties enjoying nonpolicy-related advantages do tend to locate nearer to (or
further away from) the centre than disadvantaged parties, to the extent that
proximity matters we should still expect such parties to gain votes when the
mean voter position shifts in the party’s direction, and lose votes when the
mean voter shifts away from the party’s position.
The dependent variable in our analysis is the change in the party’s nor-
malized vote share (DNV) between elections. We expect the coefficient for
proximity gain to be positive and statistically significant – in other words,
shifts towards the mean citizen should be rewarded with votes (H2). Thus our
specification is:
(6)
An additional, advanced proximity gain specification controls for the lagged
changes in normalized vote shares. We control for prior shifts in the vote,
because it is likely that – due to the regression to the mean – parties that gained
votes in the previous election will lose support in the current election:
(7)
Table 2 supports the second hypothesis by showing that shifts in proximity
are accompanied by shifts in vote shares. The squared proximity gain coeffi-
cients are positive and statistically significant in all of the specifications. In
addition, note that the sizes of the proximity gain coefficients based on the
Eurobarometer respondents’ party placements (columns 1 and 2 in Table 2)
are virtually identical to the coefficients based on the country experts’ party
placements (columns 3 and 4). These findings are extremely important because
they substantiate the conclusions drawn by existing studies on the effects of
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proximity and party support across Western Europe – namely, proximity gains
translate only into modest electoral benefits. The size of the coefficient in
column 1 (3.27) indicates that the gains in votes are relatively small for parties
benefiting from proximity gains during inter-election periods.21
Conclusion
Our simplification concentrates on the central notion that the policy pref-
erences of voters and the policy promises of parties both matter for elec-
tions. Despite the importance of this proposition, it has not been subject
to serious macro-level testing. (Erikson et al. 2002: 256)
These analyses supply us with a macro-level empirical test along the lines sug-
gested by Erikson et al. (2002) of the spatial model across Western European
party systems. Based on citizen perceptions from the Eurbarometer surveys
(1984–1998), we conclude that proximity is related to popular support (i.e.,
votes) across the multiparty systems in Western Europe. Specifically, parties
occupying positions close to the mean voter position are likely to receive
modest electoral benefits compared to noncentrist parties. Using a macro-level
approach, this finding confirms the claims arrived at by existing empirical
studies that explore multiparty systems using the spatial modeling framework.
We also add a temporal component and find that parties tend to gain votes
when the mean voter position shifts in their direction between elections. More-
over, these results are strengthened by alternative specifications based on
expert opinions of parties’ positions from the Huber-Inglehart (1995) study.
However, it should be kept in mind that this is simply a first look at an
important and complicated question. For instance, it would be interesting to
explore whether the degree to which proximity to the mean voter is rewarded
differs across countries (a question that we cannot adequately address here
due to the small number of observations per country). Another limitation of
the present study is that it only extends to a one-dimensional ideological space.
We have knowingly sacrificed the texture of more elegant two-dimensional
spatial mapping in a smaller number of countries (see, e.g., Dow 2001;
Schofield 1997) for cruder measurements of ideology in order to expand the
geographical scope of the article. In spite of these empirical constraints, there
still appears to be a tendency for centrist parties to gain votes in the party
systems we have analyzed.
Even Anthony Downs (1957: 126–127) was aware of the questionable
applicability of his central convergence prediction to multiparty systems.
Perhaps to the surprise of Downs, there are general connections between prox-
imity and vote shares existing in such systems. There are other explanatory
are moderate parties rewarded in multiparty systems?
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factors plausibly at work that have yet to be explored, such as the electoral
systems or the economic environments in which parties operate. It is not 
farfetched to expect the magnitude of the effects of proximity to vary by 
electoral setting.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank James Adams, Garrett Glasgow, Kent Jennings
and the anonymous referees for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of
this article. All remaining errors are my own.
Appendix: Parties included in the analysis
lawrence ezrow
© European Consortium for Political Research 2005
Belgium
Belgian Communist Party (PCB)
Socialist Party-Flemish (SP)
Socialist Party-French (PS)
Ecologists (Ecolo/Agalev)
Francophone Front/Walloon Rally
(FDF/RW)
People’s Union (Volksunie)
Liberal Party-Flemish (PVV)
Liberal Reformation Party (PRL)
Flemish Christian Socialists (CVP)
French Christian Socialists (PSC)
Denmark
Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk
Folkeparti)
Social Democratic Party
(Socialdemokratiet)
Radical Liberal Party (Radikale)
Christian People’s Party (Kristeligt
Folkeparti)
Center Democrats (CD)
Liberal Party (Venstre)
Conservative Party (Konservative)
Progress Party (Fremkridtspartiet)
France
Communist (PC)
Socialist (PS)
Union for French Democracy
(PR/UDF)
Gaullists – Rally for the Republic
(RPR)
National Front (FN)
Germany
Greens (Die Grünen)
German Social Democratic Party
(SPD)
Free Democratic Party (FDP)
Christian Democratic Union/Christ-
ian Social Union (CDU/CSU)
Great Britain
Labour
Social and Liberal Democrats
Conservatives
Greece
Left Coalition: Communist Party
(KKE)
Panhellenic Socialist Movement
Party (PASOK)
Democratic Renewal (Diana)
New Democracy (ND)
Ireland
Sinn Fein
Workers’ Party
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Labour
Green
Progressive Democrats
United Ireland Party (Fine Gael)
Republican Party (Fianna Fail)
Italy
Italian Communist Party (PCI)
Proletarian Democracy (DP)
Italian Socialist Party (PSI)
Radical Party (PR)
Greens (Verdi)
Italian Social Democratic Party
(PSDI)
Italian Republican Party (PRI)
Italian Liberal Party (PLI)
Christian Democrats (DC)
Italian Social Movement (MSI)
Free Democratic Party (FDP)
Luxembourg
Communist Party of Luxembourg
(KP/PC)
Green Alternative Party (GAP)
Socialist Workers Party
(LSAP/POSL)
Democratic Party – Liberals
(DP/PD)
National Movement (Bewegung)
Christian Social Party (CSV/PCS)
The Netherlands
Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP)
Radical Political Party (PPR)
Labour Party (PvdA)
Democrats ‘66 (D’66)
Christian Democratic Appeal
(CDA)
People’s Party for Freedom and
Democracy (VVD)
Reformational Political Federation
(RPF)
Reformed Political Union (GPV)
Political Reformed Party (SGP)
Center Party (CP)
Portugal
Communists (PCP)
Popular Democratic Union 
(UDP)
Portuguese Democratic Movement
(MDP/CDE)
Party of Democratic Renewal
(PRD)
Socialist Party (PS)
Social Democratic Party (PSD)
People’s Monarchy Party (PPM)
Christian Democratic Party 
(PDC)
Social Democratic Center (CDS)
Spain
Basque United People (HB)
United Left (IU)
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party
(PSOE)
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV)
Convergence and Union Party
(CiU)
Democratic and Social Center
(CDS)
Popular Coalition (CP)
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Note: Parties are ordered from ‘the left’ to ‘the right’ by country. The Huber-
Inglehart survey does not cover Greece and Luxembourg.
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Notes
1. Additional models with deterministic voting make similar non-centrist predictions by
assuming that parties are motivated by policy preferences, or by including valence
characteristics in their models (Wittman 1973, 1983; Ansolabehere & Snyder 2000;
Groseclose 2001).
2. Schofield and his co-authors emphasize the importance of ‘valence’ dimensions of eval-
uation (such as voters’ judgements about the competing party leaders’ degrees of com-
petence, integrity and charisma), arguing that parties that are disadvantaged on valence
grounds have electoral incentives to differentiate their policies from the policies of
valence-advantaged parties, and that valence-disadvantaged parties thereby enhance
their vote shares by shifting to extreme or noncentrist positions (see also Adams 1999;
Ansolabehere & Snyder 2000; Hug 1995). Adams and Merrill (see also Adams et al.
2005) present arguments that parties have electoral incentives to diverge from the centre
of the voter distribution, by appealing on policy grounds to voters who are biased
towards them for nonpolicy reasons, notably party identification. Because the partisans
of different parties typically occupy different regions of the policy space, this strategic
incentive is likely to motivate policy differentiation by the competing parties.
3. As discussed below, we also conduct alternative sets of analyses in which we employ
country experts’ placements as our measure of the parties’ positions.
4. Nagel’s (2001) study of British elections represents a partial exception to this 
generalization.
5. Of course, because government formation in multiparty parliamentary democracies
revolves around post-election coalition negotiations, government policy outputs depend
on more than the parties’ vote shares. Nevertheless, because parties’ bargaining power
in coalition negotiations depends on their seat shares – which are obviously related to
their vote shares – the empirical question of whether policy centrism enhances parties’
vote shares in important for democratic representation.
6. We note that Schofield’s (1998a, 1998b, 2004) studies typically rely on the self-
placements of party elites to calibrate the parties’ policy positions.
7. The disagreements among behavioural researchers include, but are not limited to, the
following topics: the empirical status of the party identification variable (see Fleury &
Lewis-Beck 1993; Converse & Pierce 1993); the extent to which respondents’ preferred
policy positions (and their perceptions of the parties’ positions) are subject to assimila-
tion/contrast effects (see Merrill et al. 2001); whether voters evaluate parties based on
the policy distances between the parties’ announced positions and the voters’ policy
preferences, or whether, alternatively, voters account for the fact that the parties may
not be able to fully implement their announced policy agendas due to countervailing
pressures from coalition partners or from other branches of government (see Kedar
forthcoming; Lacy & Paolino 1999, 2001). Chapter 2 in Adams et al. (2005) reviews the
problems that behavioural researchers’ disagreements pose for spatial modelers seeking
to understand parties’ policy strategies in real-world elections.
8. Specifically, both the Stokes study and the Alvarez-Nagler study report results suggest-
ing that the importance that voters attach to the parties’ policy positions – relative to
alternative influences on the vote such as economic conditions and the personal images
of party leaders – varies with the parties’ positions (i.e., that voters’ decision rules are
endogenous).
9. The remaining election returns (through 1998) were gathered using the CD-ROM
accompanying Budge et al. (2001).
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10. We note that we conducted additional statistical analyses using parties’ absolute vote
shares, and that these analyses supported substantive conclusions that were identical to
the conclusions based on normalized vote shares we report below.
11. The questions in the 1989 Eurobarometer (31A) are as follows: ‘In political matters,
people talk of “the left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale?
And, where would you place the political parties (of your country)?’
12. Below we report alternative sets of analyses which employ country experts’ party place-
ments in place of the mean positions ascribed to the parties by the Eurobarometer
respondents.
13. We note that the distributions of the respondents’ self-placements across the countries
included in the Eurobarometer survey were all similar to Figure 1 in that their shape
approximates a bell-curve and their mode is in the middle of the scale (i.e., 5 or 6 on
the 1 to 10 scale). The exceptions are Greece and Denmark, where the distribution
appears bimodal, and the mode is 8, respectively.
14. We performed alternative analyses based on the parties’ linear proximities to the mean
voter position. These analyses supported substantive conclusions that were identical to
the ones we report below, although the statistical fit of these models was not as strong
as the fit for squared proximity, suggesting that the latter measure is the appropriate
metric for evaluating the electoral effects of party positioning. This empirical finding
suggests that the parties’ vote shares are concave functions of their policy positions –
that is, parties’ vote shares drop off slowly at first as they diverge from their vote-max-
imizing positions, but then drop off more rapidly as the parties move further away.
Adams and Merrill (forthcoming) present theoretical arguments about why parties’ vote
shares can be expected to be concave functions of their positions.
15. Interestingly, if parties wish to maximize their chances of gaining office – as opposed to
maximizing votes – these results still hold up. We estimated a probit model using a binary
dependent variable indicating whether or not the party gained office in the election.
There were no substantive changes in the results.
16. Specifically, there is evidence that survey respondents tend to rationalize their vote
choices by placing the parties they like unrealistically near to their own preferred ide-
ological positions (an assimilation effect), while placing parties they dislike far from their
own ideological positions (a contrast effect) (see Merrill et al. 2001, for evidence on this
point).
17. The calculation of the expected vote loss for a party which is one unit from the mean
voter position in a four-party system is (-2.46 ¥ (1)2)/4) or only 0.615 per cent of the
vote. For two units the vote loss is estimated to be (-2.46 ¥ (2)2)/4) or 2.46 per cent. The
expected vote loss for three units is (-2.46 ¥ (3)2)/4) or 5.54 per cent.
18. For a three-party system (i.e., Britain), the expected vote losses due to proximity are
expected to be greater than a system with six competitive parties (i.e., Denmark, 1990).
For example, if a party is positioned at two and a half units away from the mean voter
position, then the expected loss in the British system is 5.1 per cent, and in the Danish
system, 2.6 per cent.
19. Our omission of these variables stems from two considerations. First is the fact that the
Eurobarometer surveys do not contain information on most of the important nonpol-
icy-related variables that behavioural researchers have identified (i.e., they do not report
respondents’ assessments of party leaders or of the parties’ campaign spending). And
second, there is extensive evidence that respondents’ perceptions of many important
nonpolicy variables – such as their perceptions of party leaders and their evaluations of
economic conditions – are biased by their political loyalties, so survey items tapping
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these variables may actually be surrogates for the respondents’ policy preferences (see
Alvarez & Nagler 2001).
20. The Italian elections, post-1992, have been omitted due to the significant changes that
were made to the electoral rules and the party system.
21. Take, for example, a party moving from two units to one unit away from the mean voter
position. Referring to the sixth equation in the text, the party’s squared proximity gain
value is ((2)2 - (1)2), or 3. Thus DNV = -1.88 + 3.27(3) or 7.93. As the number of com-
petitive parties in each system decreases or increases, 7.93 translates into more or less
votes, respectively. For instance, for a four-party system, the expected gain is 7.93/4 ª 2
percentage points, while for a six-party system the expected vote gain is 7.93/6 ª 1.3 per-
centage points.
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